ISSN 2477-1686
Vol. 12 No. 63 Agustus 2026
Why Is Corruption in Indonesia So Difficult to Eradicate?
By:
Any Rufaedah
Department of Psychology Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia &
Dynamics of Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR)
Indonesia has struggled with corruption for decades. Despite the establishment of the Commission for the Eradication of Corruption (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK) 23 years ago, corruption remains pervasive, with scandals involving trillions of rupiah—amounts several times higher than those reported in previous decades. Among the many cases, the 2024 tin mining scandal caused state losses estimated at up to 300 trillion rupiah (Akbar, 2025), and the fuel scandal, involving executives of the state-owned oil company PT Pertamina Patra Niaga, caused losses of nearly 286 trillion rupiah (Ni’am & Carina, 2025).
KPK arrested 11 individuals in 2025 alone, including local leaders, members of local parliaments, officials of state-owned enterprises (BUMN), prosecutors, and a vice minister (Sari & Carina, 2025). In early 2026, the agency arrested tax officers for allegedly receiving bribes from a private company, as well as the Regents of Madiun and Pati in East and Central Java (Ulya & Prabowo, 2026; Fadilah, 2026; Kharismaningtyas, 2026). Today, KPK is handling a new case involving Deputy Minister of Immigration and Corrections, Simly Karim, along with officials from the West Jakarta Immigration Office. The agency is also investigating other cases involving officials from the regencies of Lamongan, Muara Enim, and Indramayu.
Despite the aggressive efforts of the KPK alongside the Attorney General’s Office (Kejaksaan Agung), corruption does not appear likely to end anytime soon. Why is it so difficult to make Indonesia free from corruption? Do slow economic growth and low wage standards push people to accumulate wealth through their public positions? Economic factors may be one explanation, but not the only. Corruption in this country is rooted in a combination of social norms, economic challenges, and a cultural emphasis on wealth as a marker of social status.
In the Indonesian context, social norms that tolerate bribery and corrupt behavior can be found in public offices, taking forms such as “incentives” for public services, job opportunities for family members or relatives of officials, and budget mark-ups. Especially in lower-level offices, giving money for a service is not only tolerated but is often considered “mandatory,” and it may be seen as inappropriate if users do not offer a payment. As a result, people who require public services may feel uncomfortable if they do not give money to individuals responsible for assisting them. Even though they are aware of the negative impact of corruption on the country, they may still decide to provide such incentives in order to feel comfortable and in the hope of receiving assistance in the future. This reflects a descriptive norm, where individuals comply because they believe “everyone else is doing it” (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). The culture of bribery has indeed decreased a lot compared to what appeared during the New Order era and the years after; nevertheless, remnants of this practice still persist.
Economic necessity also plays a significant role. Service providers who accept incentives often rely on them as a source of income, as their official salaries may not sufficiently cover household needs. Meanwhile, service users may believe that providing incentives helps governmental workers meet those needs. When economic hardship becomes a justification, moral disengagement comes into play, allowing individuals to reinterpret unethical behavior as acceptable or even benevolent (Bandura, 1999). Officials may view incentives as compensation for the state’s failure to provide adequate salaries, while those who give incentives may interpret their actions as acts of kindness. At higher levels, offering luxurious gifts to officials in exchange for favors or promotions may be regarded as an “obligation” or a form of gratitude. These norms are transmitted and reinforced across generations, allowing corruption to become normalized over time. Bicchieri & Dimant (2019) emphasized that when corruption and other anti-social behaviors “are perceived as common and thus ‘normal’ and approved of, it is hard” (p. 20) even though possible to reverse them. Although digital systems to combat corruption have been successfully developed, a clean Indonesia cannot be achieved through systems alone but requires fundamental changes in social norms. In addition, digitalized systems can, in fact, be manipulated to serve human interests.
Lastly, the status associated with being wealthy is highly valued in the Indonesian context, where wealthy individuals are often respected and treated differently. This differs from many developed countries, such as European countries, Japan, and Singapore, where individuals are not judged solely on the basis of their wealth. As people are frequently evaluated according to their material possessions, owning luxury cars, houses, and fashion items is considered prestigious by many public officials. The pursuit of wealth and status, both consciously and unconsciously, may drive them to accumulate as much capital as possible, particularly when salaries in the public sector are relatively low.
On the other hand, large-scale public protests demanding stronger enforcement against corruptors have become relatively rare. Public responses are often expressed through social media, and it is a unique aspect of the current Indonesian society. They have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for digital investigation to expose suspicious wealth of officials and their families. They created symbolic forms of protest such as satire, memes, and viral content. Last year, when the oil and tin mining corruption scandals were brought to the public’s attention, netizens (internet citizens) created a poster of mega corruptions and called it “corruption league.” It imitated posters commonly shown during a football league. Their efforts have been successful in embarrassing suspected corruptors and damaging their careers; however, the impacts of the action tend to be temporary. Many corruptors still have many facilities, including when they are imprisoned, and eventually regain public positions in state bodies and political parties. Although these positions are largely out of the public eye and at a lower level, they remain economically and politically secure.
The privileges and protection enjoyed by corruptors may contribute to the rise of learned helplessness among citizens. According to the theory of learned helplessness developed by Martin Seligman (1972), repeated exposure to adverse situations that appear beyond one’s control can result in a belief that efforts are futile. Applied to the anti-corruption context, when citizens see persistent corruption despite legal penalties, media coverage, and civic protest, they may conclude that broader change is unattainable. This pessimism undermines collective action and weakens long-term civic engagement aimed at institutional reform.
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