ISSN 2477-1686
Vol. 11 No. 48 Desember 2025
Legacy of the Reformasi Movement: Indonesia's Struggle for Democracy, Identity, and National Unity
Oleh:
Yuslikha Kusuma Wardhani, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Chan-Hoong Leong, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Eko A Meinarno, Faculty of Psychology, Universitas Indonesia
Introduction
Indonesia, a vast archipelago comprising over 17,000 islands and home to more than 280 million people, is inherently multicultural. While this societal diversity has been widely acknowledged since its founding post-WWII, there was a deliberate attempt in the late 1960's to reconstruct a homogenised nationhood that gives supremacy to political Islam, guided by then President Suharto.
Suharto ruled Indonesia with centralised powers and entrenched dominance in the military. Public dissent is suppressed, corruption is rampant, and the practice of non-Islamic ethnocultural heritage is banned. This passage in history is known as the New Order regime (1966-1998).
To legitimise the iron fist approach, the regime used Pancasila—the monolithic ideology that promote national unity and one God—to repress plurality of voices, and mask its deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions. The concept of Pancasila was initially conceived as a framework for understanding differences and fostering a sense of unity (Widjanarko, 2008) and core national value (Meinarno, 2017).
The Reformasi movement of 1998, which arose in response to country's economic mismanagement and mass mobilisation, led to the collapse of the Suharto's authoritarian regime. This turning point in history sparked a collective soul-searching journey to redefine its national contour and political culture (again).
A Persistent Issue: Social Identity
The fall of the New Order gave rise to ideas of freedom that had been suppressed for over three decades. Among the most prominent expressions of this newfound freedom was the resurgence of social identity discourse. This issue, however, quickly became a flashpoint for conflict, given that any expressions of ethnic or religious social identities were never accepted during the New Order.
These re-emerging identities soon became politicised, evolving into forms of identity politics. This dynamic was evident from the outset of the Reformasi movement, notably during the May 1998 riots. These riots, which erupted not only in Jakarta but also simultaneously across several cities in Indonesia, disproportionately targeted individuals of Chinese descent (Bird, 2009). These events severely undermined Indonesia's long-standing reputation as a tolerant and pluralistic society. The violent attacks against Chinese communities and religious institutions, including temples and houses of worship, laid bare the fragility of Indonesia's national identity—one ostensibly anchored in Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity).
The tensions arising from these identity politics were expressed in the political space, where the Reformasi era witnessed the rise of groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI). These groups sought to influence the political discourse with a vision of implementing Sharia law.
As the Reformasi era unfolded, several groups began to codify identity politics (e.g., Muslim vs non-Muslim) into formal regulations. Organisations such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin), began advocating for the implementation of Islamic law, employing both revolutionary and constitutional means to pursue their agenda (Supraktino, 2023).
The Islamist movement, in particular, gained traction by promoting Sharia in ways that fundamentally contradicted the ideals of diversity and multiculturalism. Sumpter and Wardhani (2023) highlight that decentralisation policies empowered local elites, which exacerbated regional identity politics and allowed Islamist groups to gain political space in a more fragmented political landscape. This process fundamentally reshaped the Indonesian political environment, where Islamist governance and PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism) policies became increasingly entangled, creating unintended consequences that continue to influence political dynamics today.
In culturally plural societies, historically marginalised groups often experience heightened perceptions of threat and intergroup anxiety when sociopolitical shifts challenge existing identity boundaries (Leong & Ward, 2011). This pattern resonates with the Indonesian experience after Reformasi, where the re-emergence of long-suppressed ethnic and religious identities gave rise to intensified social and political tensions.
Fostering Fear Rather Than Strength
The social unease within Indonesia's multicultural society stems partly from attempts to impose ideological conformity across various dimensions of life, including aspects unrelated to religious rituals. Local Islamist militias, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), have been allowed to operate with relative impunity. These groups, which champion "anti-crime" initiatives, ranging from opposing so-called "Christianisation" to calling for the implementation of Sharia, have been tolerated, and at times instrumentalised, by political elites seeking electoral advantages. Unlike Jemaah Islamiyah, however, these militias do not reject the legitimacy of the Indonesian state, nor do they seek to replace it with an Islamic caliphate (Heiduk, 2012). At the same time, decentralisation policies empowered local elites, contributing to a shift in nationalism that has increasingly taken the form of regional resistance to central authority (Gobel, 2018).
A further concern lies in the presence of transnational jihadist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, which have established operational bases in Indonesia. While these groups perceive post-Suharto Indonesia as a more democratic but still secular state—one they fundamentally oppose—they have continued to pursue terrorist activities in an attempt to establish an Islamic state. These efforts, however, have been met with increasingly effective counterterrorism measures by the Indonesian government (Heiduk, 2012).
Indonesia's Democracy: Grounded in National Values
Given Indonesia's deeply multicultural character, democracy represents the most logical and rational means of maintaining national unity. It enables the participation of all groups in the collective project of nation-building. Today, Indonesia's democratic system continues to function reasonably well. Open elections for parliament and the presidency have been held regularly since 2004. While the outcomes may not satisfy all constituents, democratic processes have provided space for expressing diverse perspectives.
However, what must be emphasised is the need to strengthen social cohesion through reaffirming shared national values, specifically Pancasila. As the foundational ideology of the Indonesian nation, Pancasila should not be used as a tool of repression. Instead, it should serve as a guiding principle for both individual conduct (Meinarno, 2017; 2021) and policymaking. The Reformasi movement itself was not an effort to replace national values, but to dismantle an authoritarian regime. Therefore, the ongoing struggle should focus on meaningful reform, rather than attempts to displace Pancasila in the name of majoritarian democracy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the legacy of the Reformasi movement, shaped by both path dependence and social constructivism, remains deeply contested, as reflected in the enduring tensions between pluralism and identity politics outlined above. We recognise these tensions as a direct legacy of the New Order. At the same time, we must also acknowledge that democracy has created a political environment where competition between groups has intensified. In such a system, differences of opinion and dissent regarding government policies are expected. However, the rise of anarchic actions, ethnic and religious conflicts, and separatist movements in the name of democracy has given the impression that the spirit of national unity is eroding. In these cases, group interests and personal agendas have increasingly preceded a collective sense of national identity.
Final Reflection
As Indonesia moves towards a more promising future, it is salient to monitor how well the country can build a strong sense of social cohesion and citizenship, inclusive governance and democratic integrity, and a commitment to justice and accountability. In this regard, democracy based on national values is needed.
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